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Abstract
Multiple-stage adaptive architectures are conceived to face with the problem of target detection
buried in noise, clutter, and intentional interference. First, a scenario where the radar system is under
the electronic attack of noise-like interferers is considered. In this context, two sets of training samples
are jointly exploited to devise a novel two-step estimation procedure of the interference covariance
matrix. Then, this estimate is plugged in the adaptive matched filter to mitigate the deleterious effects
of the noise-like jammers on radar sensitivity. Besides, a second scenario, which extends the former
by including the presence of coherent jammers, is addressed. Specifically, the sparse nature of data is
brought to light and the compressive sensing paradigm is applied to estimate target response and coherent
jammers amplitudes. The likelihood ratio test, where the unknown parameters are replaced by previous
estimates, is designed and assessed. Remarkably, the sparse approach allows for echo classification and
estimation of both angles of arrival and number of the interfering sources. The performance analysis,
conducted resorting to simulated data, highlights the effectiveness of the newly proposed architectures
also in comparison with suitable competing architectures (when they exist).
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2I. INTRODUCTION
In the last decades, radar art has been significantly influenced by the advances in technology as cor-
roborated by the last-generation processing boards capable of performing huge amounts of computations
in a very short time while keeping the costs relatively low. This abundance of computation power has
allowed for the development of radar systems endowed with more and more sophisticated processing
schemes.
To provide a tangible example, let us focus on search radars which are primarily concerned with the
detection and tracking of targets embedded in thermal noise, clutter, and, possibly, intentional interference,
also known as Electronic Countermeasure (ECM) [1]–[4]. In this context, the open literature is rich with
novel contributions on adaptive detection with the result that detection architectures are evolving towards
a continuous performance enhancement. Consider, for example, the space-time detection algorithms that
exploit large volumes of data from sensor arrays and/or pulse trains to take advantage of temporal and
spatial integration/diversity [5]–[15]. Another route followed by the radar community to improve the
detection performance consists in using the available information about the structure of the Interference
Covariance Matrix (ICM) at the design stage. As a matter of fact, special structures of the ICM are
induced by the system and/or interference properties [16]–[26]. As an illustration of this fact, consider
those decision rules devised assuming that the ICM is centrohermitian. These algorithms allow us to
reduce the number of training samples required for the ICM estimation [16]–[23], [27], [28] by almost a
half while maintaining a satisfactory detection performance. Further examples are provided in [24], [25],
where it is shown that the spectral symmetry of the clutter can be used for instance to obtain gains of
about 3 dB (in SINR, namely Signal-to-Interference plus Noise Ratio), for a Probability of Detection
Pd = 0.9 and Probability of False Alarm Pfa = 10
−4, in comparison to conventional detectors.
In most of the above contributions, the ICM results from the superposition of two components repre-
sentative of the following two interference sources
• the electronic devices generating thermal noise, which is ubiquitous;
• the specific operating environment, whose backscattering gives rise to the clutter component, which
is assumed dominant with respect to thermal noise.
Additionally, conventional ICM estimation procedures exploit training samples (secondary data) collected
in the proximity of the Cell Under Test (CUT).
However, radars might be potential targets of electronic attacks by an adversary force, which can use,
for instance, active techniques aimed at protecting a platform from being detected and tracked by the
radar [4]. This is accomplished through two approaches: masking and deception. Noncoherent Jammers
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3or Noise-Like Jammers (NLJs) attempt to mask targets generating nondeceptive interference which blends
into the thermal noise of the radar receiver. As a consequence, the radar sensitivity is degraded due to
the increase of the constant false alarm rate threshold which adapts to the higher level of noise [2], [4].
In addition, this increase makes more difficult to discover that jamming is taking place [3], [29].
On the other hand, the Coherent Jammers (CJs) transmit low-duty cycle signals intended to inject false
information into the radar processor. Specifically, they are capable of receiving, modifying, amplifying,
and retransmitting the radar’s own signal to create false targets maintaining radar’s range, Doppler, and
angle far away from the true position of the platform under protection [2], [4], [29], [30].
Against the aforementioned electronic attacks, radar designers have developed defense strategies re-
ferred to as Electronic Counter-CounterMeasure (ECCM) which can be categorized as antenna-related,
transmitter-related, receiver-related, and signal-processing-related depending on the main radar subsystem
where they take place [29]. The first line of defense against jamming is represented by the radar antenna,
whose beampattern can be suitably exploited and/or shaped to eliminate sidelobe false targets or to
attenuate the power of NLJs entering from the antenna sidelobes. The Sidelobe Blanker (SLB) is an
ECCM technique against pulsed interferences [31]–[33] which compares the detected signal amplitude
from the main channel with that of an auxiliary channel1. Specifically, when the auxiliary channel signal
power is greater than that from the main channel, it is likely that the radar is under attack of a CJ
from the sidelobes and, hence, the detection is blanked. In the presence of continuous or high duty cycle
interferers, the SLB becomes ineffective since it would inhibit the detection of true targets for most of the
time. In these situations, the Sidelobe Canceler (SLC) represents a viable ECCM against NLJs [2], [34],
[35]. It places nulls in the sidelobes of the main receiver beam along the directions of arrival of the NLJs
which are adaptively estimated using auxiliary channels. Both the SLB and SLC can be jointly used to
face with NLJs and CJs contemporaneously impinging on the sidelobes of the victim radar [36]. Finally,
it is important to mention that modern radars employ a digitally based approach to implement the SLC
function. Specifically, digital samples from each channel of an electronically scanned array are weighted
to adaptively shape the resulting beampattern. These techniques belong to the more general family of
algorithms called Adaptive Digital Beamforming [4], which can be classified as signal-processing-related
ECCM.
In this paper, we devise adaptive detection architectures with signal-processing-related ECCM capa-
bilities against the attack of NLJs and/or CJs from the antenna sidelobes. At the design stage, we focus
on two operating scenarios which differ for the presence of an unknown number of CJs. More precisely,
1In the following, “channel” is used to denote the transmit/receive chain of the radar system [1].
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4in the first scenario, the target echoes compete against thermal noise, clutter, and NLJs whose number is
unknown, whereas the second scenario extends the former by including prospective CJs. Note that the
second scenario is more difficult than the first one, which represents the starting point for the derivations
allowing to easily drive the reader towards the design of more complex systems. Both detection problems
are formulated in terms of binary hypothesis tests and, following the lead of [37], two independent sets
of secondary data are assumed available for estimation purposes.
The first set comes from the conventional radar reference window surrounding the CUT and shares
the same ICM components as the CUT including the clutter component. The other training set can be
acquired by observing that the clutter contribution is, in general, range-dependent and tied up to the
transmitted waveform. Therefore, it is possible to acquire data free of clutter components and affected by
the thermal noise and possible jamming signals only. For instance, for a system employing pulse-to-pulse
frequency agility which transmits one pulse, clutter-free data can be collected before transmitting the
pulse waveform by listening to the environment. Another example of practical interest concerns radar
systems transmitting coherent pulse trains with a sufficiently high pulse repetition interval. In this case,
data collected before transmitting the next pulse and at high ranges (or after the instrumental range),
result free of clutter contribution. However, unlike [37], in this paper, we propose a novel two-step
procedure to estimate the ICM components in a more effective way. Specifically, the thermal noise and
NLJ components are estimated using the second data set2 (first step). The latter estimate replaces the
corresponding ICM components of the conventional data set, which is used to estimate the remaining
unknown ICM component, namely, the clutter component (second step). The number of NLJs impinging
on the victim radar is unknown and, hence, is estimated resorting to either the so-called Model Order
Selection (MOS) rules [38], which provide more reliable results than the Maximum Likelihood Approach
(MLA) in the presence of nested hypotheses, or a heuristic ad hoc procedure based on the MLA. Observe
that the last procedure can also be classified as a MOS rule but it does not rely on an information criterion
as in [38]. More importantly, the herein proposed ICM estimation procedure requires a less restrictive
constraint on the required volume of data with respect to that presented in [37] (a point better explained in
Section III-A). Finally, the detection problem in the presence of NLJs is solved by applying the two-step
Generalized Likelihood Ratio Test (GLRT) design procedure [6] where the ICM of the CUT is replaced
by the new estimate. The final result consists in a multiple-stage architecture capable of taking advantage
of the information carried by the additional training data set.
2Note that in [37] it is only assumed that the difference between the ICM of the conventional training set and that of the
additional training set is positive semidefinite, while in the present paper information about the structure of this difference is
exploited.
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5The other considered detection problem also includes the presence of multiple CJs in addition to NLJs,
clutter, and thermal noise. Under this assumption, we reformulate the problem at hand in order to bring to
light its sparse nature. As a consequence, compressive sensing reconstruction algorithms arise as natural
choices to solve it. In the specific case, we exploit the Sparse Learning via Iterative Minimization (SLIM)
[39], due to its trade off between low computational cost and reconstruction performance, to jointly
estimate (under the alternative hypothesis) the unknown target and CJs responses. More precisely, we
compute the Likelihood Ratio Test (LRT) where the ICM is replaced by the previously derived estimate,
while target response and CJ amplitudes are estimated by the SLIM. The exploitation of SLIM (or,
generally speaking, compressed sensing algorithms) is due to the fact that, as a byproduct, it allows for
echo classification and estimation of both angles of arrival (AOA) and number of the interfering sources.
In fact, if the LRT statistic is over the detection threshold, the following situations may occur:
• only CJs are present (target response is zero while CJ amplitudes are nonzero);
• only the target is present (target response is nonzero while CJ amplitudes are zero);
• simultaneous presence of the target and CJs (target response and CJ amplitudes are nonzero).
With these remarks in mind, we use the estimates provided by SLIM to build up a decision logic
capable of discriminating among the above conditions which, evidently, form a multiple hypothesis test.
Remarkably, this approach can be used in place of the conventional SLB since it recognizes possible CJs
echoes which can be concurrent with target echoes without blanking the detection. Thus, the proposed
detection architecture features SLB/SLC functionalities overcoming the limitations of the SLB.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II is devoted to problem formulation
and definition of quantities used in the next derivations while the design of the detection architectures
and estimation procedures are contained in Section III. In Section IV, the behavior of the proposed
architectures is investigated by means of numerical examples. Finally, concluding remarks and future
research tracks are given in Section V. Some derivations are confined in the appendices.
Notation and List of Acronyms
The reader is referred to Table I for the list of the acronyms contained in this paper. Moreover, vectors
and matrices are denoted by boldface lower-case and upper-case letters, respectively. Symbols det(·) and
tr (·) denote the determinant and the trace of a square matrix, respectively. Symbols I and 0 represent
the identity matrix and the null vector or matrix of suitable dimensions, respectively. The imaginary unit
is denoted by j. Given a vector a, diag (a) indicates the diagonal matrix whose ith diagonal element is
the ith entry of a. For a finite set A, |A| stands for its cardinality. As to the numerical sets, R is the set
of real numbers, RN×M is the set of (N ×M)-dimensional real matrices (or vectors if M = 1), C is the
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6set of complex numbers, and CN×M is the set of (N ×M)-dimensional complex matrices (or vectors if
M = 1). The (k, l)-entry (or l-entry) of a generic matrix A (or vector a) is denoted by A(k, l) (or a(l)).
We use (·)T and (·)† to denote transpose and conjugate transpose, respectively. The Clutter-to-Noise Ratio
and the Jammer-to-Noise Ratio are denoted by CNR and JNR, respectively. The conditional probability
of an event A given the even B is represented as P (A|B). Finally, we write x ∼ CNN (m,M ) if x is
a complex circular N -dimensional normal vector with mean m and positive definite covariance matrix
M , whereas X = [x1, . . . ,xM ] ∼ CNN,M (m,M , I) if xi ∼ CNN (m,M), ∀i = 1, . . . ,M , and are
statistically independent.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a radar system which exploits N spatial (identical) channels to sense the surrounding envi-
ronment. The incoming signal is conditioned by means of a baseband down-conversion and a filtering
matched to the transmitted pulse waveform. Next, the output of the matched filter is suitably sampled
and the samples are organized into N -dimensional complex vectors representing the range bins [1], [13].
In what follows, we denote the vector of the returns from the CUT by z ∈ CN×1, while the conventional
training set, formed by collecting the returns from the range bins surrounding the CUT [1], [5], is stored
in the matrix Z = [z1, . . . ,zK ] ∈ C
N×K . Finally, we assume also that the system acquires an additional
set of training vectors (free of the clutter component and affected by thermal noise and possible NLJs)
by listening to the environment (namely, operating in passive mode) [37]. This second set is denoted by
R = [r1, . . . , rM ] ∈ C
N×M .
As stated in Section I, in this paper we focus our attention on two detection problems representative
of two scenarios where the latter subsumes the former as a special case. This choice is dictated by the
need to make the derivations easy to be followed. In fact, the scenarios differ for the presence of CJs in
the CUT. Specifically, the first problem, which is the same as in [37], can be formulated as
H1,0 :
 z = αTv(θT ) +nzk = nk, rm =mm, k = 1, . . . ,K, m = 1, . . . ,M,
H0,0 :
 z = nzk = nk, rm =mm, k = 1, . . . ,K, m = 1, . . . ,M,
(1)
where
• n, n1, . . . ,nK , m1, . . . ,mM are statistically independent random vectors distributed as follows:
[n,n1, . . . ,nK ] ∼ CNN,K(0,M1, I) and [m1, . . . ,mM ] ∼ CNN,M (0,M 2, I);
• αT is a complex factor representative of the target response and channel effects;
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7• v(θT ) =
[
1, ej2pi(d/λ) sin(θT ), . . . , ej2pi(d/λ)(N−1) sin(θT )
]T
is the nominal steering vector with d the
array interelement spacing, λ the carrier wavelength, and θT the nominal AOA of the target echoes
measured with respect to the array broadside.
Unlike [37], we assume that the ICMs exhibit specific structures adhering to situations of practical
value, namely M1 = σ
2I +Mnj +M c and M2 = σ
2I +Mnj , where σ
2I is the thermal noise
component due to the electronic devices with σ2 > 0 the resulting power, M c is representative of
the clutter, and Mnj is the contribution raising from the presence of NLJs and can be expressed as
Mnj =
∑Nnj
i=1 σ
2
nj,iv(θnj,i)v(θnj,i)
† with Nnj , σ
2
nj,i, and θnj,i being the number of NLJs, the power, and
the AOA of the ith NLJ, respectively. An important remark on the relationship between the rank ofMnj
and Nnj is required for further developments. Precisely, note that when the NLJs are angularly very
close to each other, then the inner product between the resulting NLJ steering vectors is very close to
1. It follows that the eigendecomposition of Mnj leads to a situation where the maximum eigenvalue
comprises most of the jammers’ energy and the associated eigenvector is representative of the direction
from where such energy is transmitted. The remaining eigenvalues differ by several order of magnitude
with respect to the maximum eigenvalue and, hence, they can be neglected along with the associated
eigenvectors. From an alternate point of view, when an orthonormal basis for the subspace spanned
by closely spaced jammer steering vectors is computed by applying the Gram-Schmidt process [40], it
turns out that, in the new reference system, there exists a dominant component which is several order of
magnitude greater than the others. As a consequence, due to the finite precision of the radar processing
unit, the dimension of the subspace spanned by these steering vectors (and, hence, the rank of Mnj)
might be less than or equal to the actual number of NLJ steering vectors.
The second scenario accounts for the joint presence of NLJs and CJs in the CUT. This seemingly
minor modification leads to a more general and difficult problem, which encompasses the former and
can be written as
H1,1 :

z = αTv(θT ) +
Nq∑
i=1
βiv(θq,i) + n,
zk = nk, rm =mm, k = 1, . . . ,K, m = 1, . . . ,M,
H0,0 :
 z = n,zk = nk, rm =mm, k = 1, . . . ,K, m = 1, . . . ,M,
(2)
where βi and θq,i are the magnitude and the AOA of the ith CJ, respectively, Nq is the number of CJs
attacking the radar, while the assumptions on n, nk, and mm keep unaltered. It is clear that problem
(2) reduces to (1) when βi = 0, ∀i = 1, . . . , Nq.
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8For future reference, it is worth providing the following definitions. Specifically, the probability density
functions (pdfs) of Z and R under all the hypotheses are3
f(Z;σ2,Mnj,M c) =
exp{−tr [M−11 ZZ
†]}
[piN det(M1)]
K
and f(R;σ2,Mnj) =
exp{−tr [M−12 RR
†]}
[piN det(M 2)]
M
, (3)
respectively. On the other hand, the pdf of z under Hl,h, (l, h) ∈ {(0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 1)}, exhibits the
following expression
flh(z; lαT , hβ, hθq, σ
2,Mnj,M c,Hlh) =
1
piN det(M 1)
× exp
−tr
M−11
z − lαTv(θT )− h Nq∑
i=1
βiv(θq,i)
z − lαTv(θT )− h Nq∑
i=1
βiv(θq,i)
†

 ,
(4)
where β = [β1, . . . , βNq ]
T and θq = [θq,1, . . . , θq,Nq ]
T . Finally, let us denote the likelihood func-
tions of the distribution parameters as LZ(σ
2,Mnj,M c) = f(Z;σ
2,Mnj,M c), LR(σ
2,Mnj) =
f(R;σ2,Mnj), Lz(αT , σ
2,Mnj ,M c) = f10(z;αT , 0, 0, σ
2,Mnj ,M c,H10), and L
′
z(αT ,β,θq, σ
2,Mnj ,M c) =
f11(z;αT ,β,θq, σ
2,Mnj,M c,H11).
III. DETECTION ARCHITECTURE DESIGNS
In this section, we devise adaptive decision schemes capable of operating under the attack of NLJs
and/or CJs. In order to simplify the derivations, we first focus on problem (1) where only NLJs are
contaminating data and, then, we account for the presence of possible coherent interferers in addition to
NLJs.
A. NLJ-only Attack
The design is structured into two parts. In the first part, we present an innovative estimation algorithm
for M1 based upon the MLA assuming, at the design stage, that the rank of Mnj , r say, which is
representative of the effective interfering sources number, is known. The last assumption is motivated by
the fact that estimating r through the MLA might return erroneous results due to the presence of nested
hypotheses. Thus, we first assume that r is known and then we replace it with a suitable estimate. To
this end, in the second part, we exploit previous results to conceive multi-stage architectures facing with
the situations where r is not known but bounded from above by the maximum number of NLJs that is
3 In what follows, we refer to the ICM of Z using the notation M1, σ
2
I +Mnj +M c, or M2 +Mc as well as we refer
to the ICM of R writing M2 or σ
2
I +Mnj .
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9generally known from system specifications and/or the amount of computational resources. In the detail,
we estimate r resorting to Information-based or heuristic ad hoc MOS rules which represent an effective
means to provide reliable estimates of the number of NLJs.
Let us focus on problem (1) and suppose that the rank of Mnj is known
4. Unlike [37], the herein
proposed estimation procedure exploits all the available structure information aboutM1 andM2. Since
the maximum likelihood estimation of M 1 and M2 through the joint pdf of Z and R is not an easy
task at least to best of authors’ knowledge, we resort to a two-step suboptimal procedure according to
the following rationale
1) use R (the additional training set) to find the maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) ofM 2, denoted
by
M̂2 = σ̂
2I + M̂nj = argmax
σ2,Mnj
LR(σ
2,Mnj), (5)
where σ̂2 and M̂nj are the MLEs of σ
2 and Mnj , respectively;
2) compute the MLE of M c based on Z assuming that M2 is known, namely
M̂ c[M 2] = argmax
M c
LZ(σ
2,Mnj,M c); (6)
3) replace M2 in (6) with M̂2.
As for the first step, in Appendix A, we show that the expression of M̂2 is
M̂2 = US1DU
†
S1, (7)
where D = diag
{
γ1,1
M , ...,
γ1,r
M ,
N∑
i=r+1
γ1,i/M(N − r), ...,
N∑
i=r+1
γ1,i/M(N − r)
}
with γ1,1 ≥ γ1,2 ≥
... ≥ γ1,N > 0 the eigenvalues of RR
† and US1 ∈ C
N×N a unitary matrix containing the corresponding
eigenvectors. When r = 0, it is not difficult to show that D = diag
{
1
MN
N∑
i=1
γ1,i, ...,
1
MN
N∑
i=1
γ1,i
}
.
The estimator of M c described in the second step of the procedure is a function of M2 which is
assumed known. Thus, the resulting likelihood function depends on M c only and can be recast as
LZ(σ
2,Mnj,M c) = LZ(M c) =
exp{−tr [(M 2 +M c)
−1ZZ†]}
[piN det(M2 +M c)]
K
. (8)
In Appendix B, we prove that the MLE of M c for known M 2 is given by
M̂ c[M 2] =M
1
2
2US2Ω̂cU
†
S2M
1
2
2 . (9)
4Recall that the latter might not coincide with Nnj because of the angular separation between the NLJs.
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Algorithm 1 Estimation Procedure for M1
Input: R ∈ CN×M , Z ∈ CN×K , r ≤ Nnj
Output: M̂1
1: Compute the Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) of R given by R = US1DRV R
2: Compute DRD
†
R = diag (γ1,1, ..., γ1,N )
3: Compute D = diag
{
γ1,1/M, ..., γ1,r/M,
1
M(N−r)
∑N
i=r+1 γ1,i, ...,
1
M(N−r)
∑N
i=r+1 γ1,i
}
or, when
r = 0, D = diag
{∑
N
i=1
γ1,i
MN , ...,
∑
N
i=1
γ1,i
MN
}
4: Compute M̂2 = US1DU
†
S1
5: Compute the SVD of M̂
− 1
2
2 Z given by M̂
− 1
2
2 Z = US2DZV
†
Z
6: Compute DZD
†
Z = diag (γ2,1, ..., γ2,N )
7: Compute Ω̂c = diag
{
λ̂c,1, . . . , λ̂c,N
}
, λ̂c,i = max{γ2,i/K − 1, 0}, i = 1, . . . , N
8: Compute M̂ c[M̂2] = M̂
1
2
2US2Ω̂cU
†
S2M̂
1
2
2
9: Return M̂1 = M̂2 + M̂ c[M̂ 2]
In the last equation, Ω̂c = diag
{
λ̂c,1, . . . , λ̂c,N
}
, where λ̂c,i = max
{γ2,i
K − 1, 0
}
, i = 1, . . . , N , with
γ2,1 ≥ ... ≥ γ2,N ≥ 0 the eigenvalues of M
− 1
2
2 ZZ
†M
− 1
2
2 and US2 ∈ C
N×N is the unitary matrix of
the corresponding eigenvectors.
As final step of the estimation procedure, we replace M2 with M̂2 and compute
M̂1 = M̂2 + M̂ c[M̂2]. (10)
It is important to observe that this new estimation procedure (schematically summarized in Algorithm 1)
requires that M > r to ensure that M̂2 is invertible with probability 1, instead of M > N > r.
Now, we focus on the case where r is unknown and should be somehow estimated from data. To this
end, two different strategies are conceived.
The first strategy relies on a three-stage detection architecture (depicted in Figure 1) where the first
two stages (actually, the second stage consists of two sub-blocks) are devoted to the estimation of M 1
(andM2) and incorporate the Information-based MOS rules [38]. More precisely, the first stage provides
an estimate of r and feeds the second stage which is responsible for the estimation of M2 and M 1
according to Algorithm 1. The third stage accomplishes the detection task.
The second approach consists in a modification of the maximum likelihood estimation of M2 which
accounts for the significant hop in the order of magnitude of the eigenvalues of RR† when NLJs are
present (a point better explained in Subsection III-A2). This discontinuity can be justified by noticing
that common JNR values are in the range [30, 60] dB [41]. It follows that r can be estimated by detecting
this hop in magnitude.
June 28, 2019 DRAFT
11
1) Three-stage Detection Architectures relying on Information-based MOS Rules: A block scheme of
the proposed architectures is depicted in Figure 1: the first two blocks5 perform the estimates ofM2 and
M1 exploiting Information-based MOS rules for selecting r. The last block represents the final detection
step. Here, it is important to note that to estimate r the MLA fails because the hypotheses are nested and
the likelihood function monotonically increases with r. Thus, focusing on the first block, the estimation
of r is accomplished exploiting the MOS rules which balance the growth of the likelihood function by
means of a penalty term. Specifically, we consider the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), the Bayesian
Information Criterion (BIC), and the Generalized Information Criterion (GIC) [38]. Following the lead
of [42, Ch.7], it is possible to show that, when r is known, the number of unknown parameters of the
distribution of R is kp(r) = r(2N−r)+1. As a consequence, the mentioned MOS rules can be expressed
as
rˆ = argmin
r∈{0,...,Nmaxnj }
{−2l(R, r) + p(r)}, (11)
where Nmaxnj is the maximum number of jammers and
l(R, r) = −MN log pi −M
r∑
i=1
log
γ1,i
M
−M(N − r) log
[
1
M(N − r)
N∑
i=r+1
γ1,i
]
−MN (12)
is6 the compressed log-likelihood of R assuming that r is known and p(r) = kp(r)ν is the penalty term.
Finally, factor ν takes on the following values
ν =

2, AIC,
1 + ρ, ρ ≥ 1, GIC,
lnM, BIC.
(14)
Once the estimate rˆ is available, it can be used in place of r in Appendix A to estimateM2. The resulting
estimate of M 2 is, subsequently, used to obtain M̂1 as shown in Appendix B.
The last block of the proposed architecture implements an adaptive decision rule, devised resorting
to the two-step GLRT design criteria [6]. Specifically, we first compute the GLRT test assuming that
M1 is known. Then, the fully adaptive detector is obtained by replacing M1 with a suitable estimate.
5Note that the second block is formed by two sub-blocks.
6Note that in the case where r = 0, the term M
∑r
i=1
log
γ1,i
M
does not appear and, in addition, when rˆ = 0, the procedure
returns
M̂2 = diag
{∑N
i=1 γ1,i
MN
, . . . ,
∑N
i=1 γ1,i
MN
}
. (13)
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According to the first step, the GLRT based on the CUT for known M1 is the following decision rule
max
αT
f10(z;αT , 0, 0, σ
2,Mnj,M c)
f00(z; 0, 0, 0, σ2,Mnj,M c)
H1
>
<
H0
η, (15)
where fl0(z; . . .), l = 0, 1, is defined by (4) and η is the detection threshold
7 value to be set according
to the desired Pfa. It is not difficult to prove that (15) is statistically equivalent to
|z†M−11 v(θT )|
2
v†(θT )M
−1
1 v(θT )
H1
>
<
H0
η. (16)
Finally, the adaptivity is achieved replacing M1 in (16) with the estimate (10) to come up with
|z†M̂
−1
1 v(θT )|
2
v†(θT )M̂
−1
1 v(θT )
H1
>
<
H0
η. (17)
For future reference, we refer to the above decision rule as Improved Double-Trained Adaptive Matched
Filter (IDT-AMF), whereas we call the three-stage architectures coupling the name of the MOS rule used
to estimate r and the acronym IDT-AMF. For instance, when BIC is part of the architecture, we refer to
the latter as IDT-AMF-BIC.
2) Two-Stage Architecture based upon an Ad Hoc MLE of M2: In the following, we propose a
modification of the previously described three-stage architectures which consists in removing the block
responsible for the estimate of r and incorporating this feature in the block that returns the estimates of
M1 andM2 through a heuristic MOS rule. To this end, let us remind that the goal of NLJs is to increase
the power noise level within the victim radar making the adaptive threshold as high as possible with the
result of masking the platforms under protection. This fact has some implications for the eigenvalues
of the ICM which can be suitably exploited to estimate r. To have a clear vision of this situation, in
Figure 2 we plot the eigenvalues ofM2 (which is the true
8 ICM) for Nnj = 2, 3 NLJs sharing JNR= 30
dB. Inspection of the figure highlights that the presence of NLJs breaks down the eigenvalue set of M 2
introducing a dramatic drop in magnitude.
The above behavior comes in handy to estimate the model order r by thresholding the difference in
magnitude between consecutive eigenvalues of S2 =
1
MRR
†, starting from the lowest values. Specifically,
let γ1,1/M ≥ γ1,2/M ≥ ... ≥ γ1,N/M be the eigenvalues of S2, then the estimation of r is described
7Hereafter, the generic detection threshold is denoted by η.
8In practice, the ICM is estimated from data and quality of the estimate leads to noise eigenvalue jitter that can be stabilized
by means of diagonal loading [4].
June 28, 2019 DRAFT
13
in Algorithm 2, where η is a threshold whose value reflects the difference in magnitude between the
eigenvalues associated with both NLJs and thermal noise and those representative of the thermal noise
only. Notice that the underlying decision problem solved by this approach isH
′′
1 : rm ∼ CNN (0, σ
2I +Mnj), m = 1, . . . ,M,
H
′′
0 : rm ∼ CNN (0, σ
2I), m = 1, . . . ,M,
(18)
where the rank of Mnj is unknown. It turns out that, under H
′′
0 , the unknown parameter is σ
2, which
must be estimated in order to set the detection threshold. To this end, several strategies are possible. For
instance, a lookup table can be filled up off-line by measuring the thermal noise power under different
operating conditions. Then, each entry of this table could be used when the system is in operation.
An alternate approach might consist in scheduling a collection of noisy samples when the antenna is
disengaged and exploiting such samples to estimate the noise power.
Finally, once r has been estimated, M̂2 can be obtained as described in Appendix A and the IDT-
AMF is applied. In the following, we call this architecture Eigenvalue-based IDT-AMF and we use the
abbreviation IDT-AMF-EIG.
Algorithm 2 Estimation Procedure for r
Input: η, γ1,1/M ≥ γ1,2/M ≥ ...γ1,N/M > 0
Output: r̂
1: Set i = N − 1, rˆ = 0
2: Compute ∆i =
1
M (γ1,i − γ1,i+1)
3: If ∆i > η, then rˆ = i and go to step 6 else go to step 4
4: Set i = i− 1
5: If i ≥ 1 go to step 2 else go to step 6
6: Return r̂
B. NLJs and Coherent Interferers Joint Attack
In this subsection, we focus on problem (2) and devise an architecture capable of detecting point-like
targets assuming that noise-like jammers as well as coherent interferers contaminate the echoes from the
CUT. Specifically, such architecture consists of a covariance estimation stage, which relies on the results
obtained in Section III-A1, followed by a new detection stage which incorporates a sparse reconstruction
algorithm. This choice is dictated by the fact that problem (2) hides an inherent sparse nature, which
can be drawn by means of a suitable reformulation. Thus, we select the so-called SLIM algorithm as
sparse reconstruction algorithm since it provides a good trade off between computational requirements
and reconstruction performance [39].
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Let us consider the hypothesis H1,1, defined in (2), where it is assumed that a number of coherent
interferers (Nq) are present together with the NLJs and note that z is the sum of three components
z = αTv(θT ) +
Nq∑
i=1
βiv(θq,i) + n. (19)
To effectively apply the SLIM approach, it is necessary to bring to light the sparse nature of (19) recasting
the above equation as a standard sparse model. From an intuitive point of view, note that radar system
steers the beam along several directions to cover the surveillance area, but backscattered echoes and/or
interfering signals hit the system from a few directions only. With this remark in mind, let us sample the
angular sector under surveillance and form a discrete and finite set of angles denoted by Θ = {θ1, . . . , θL},
θ1 ≤ θ2 ≤ . . . ≤ θL. Moreover, we assume that the target nominal angle θT and the AOA of possible
Nq ≪ L coherent interferers belong to Θ. Thus, if we define V = [v(θ1), ...,v(θL)] ∈ C
N×L as the
model matrix whose columns are the steering vectors associated with the angular positions {θ1, ..., θL}
and a vector α = [α1, ..., αL]
T ∈ CL×1 whose nonzero entries correspond to the AOAs of the target and
the coherent interferers in V , then it is possible to recast z as
z = V α+ n, (20)
where α is assumed to contain the target response αT as well as the magnitudes of the coherent jammers
{β}
Nq
i=1. It is important to observe that since Nq ≪ L, then α is a sparse vector. In fact, from (20), it
turns out that only Nq + 1 components of α are possibly different from zero. In this case, the SLIM
algorithm can be used to produce a very accurate representation for the scene of interest. Remarkably,
we can exploit the sparse estimate returned by the SLIM to address the following classification problem
• target plus noise-like interferers hypothesis:
H1 : z = αTv(θT ) + n; (21)
• noise-like plus coherent interferers hypothesis:
H2 : z =
Nq∑
i=1
βiv(θq,i) + n; (22)
• target plus noise-like and coherent interferers hypothesis:
H3 : z = αTv(θT ) +
Nq∑
i=1
βiv(θq,i) +n. (23)
Thus, as shown in what follows, the newly proposed architecture exhibits, as a byproduct, signal classi-
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fication capabilities. Let us start the design by writing the LRT based upon the CUT
Λ(z;α,M 1) =
f1(z;α,M 1,H1,1)
f0(z;0,M 1,H0,0)
H1,1
>
<
H0,0
η, (24)
where fl(z; lα,M1,Hl,l) is the pdf of z under Hl,l, l = 0, 1, whose expression is
fl(z; lα,M 1,Hl,l) =
1
piN det(M1)
exp{−tr [M−11 (z − lV α)(z − lV α)
†]}. (25)
Now, note that decision rule (24) is not of practical interest since both α and M1 are not known and,
hence, must be estimated from data. As already stated at the beginning of this subsection, the estimate
of M1 can be accomplished using the procedures described in Algorithm 1. As for α, it is estimated
resorting to the framework proposed in [39]. Specifically, let us assume that α is a random vector
independent of the noise component and that obeys a prior promoting the sparsity, given by
f(α; q) =
1
C
L∏
i=1
exp
{
−
2
q
(|αi|
q − 1)
}
, (26)
where C is a normalization constant and q ∈ Ωq = (0, 1] is a tuning parameter (smaller values of q
correspond to sharper peak of the prior distribution and consequently sparser estimate of α). Then, α is
estimated solving the following maximization problem
max
α
f1(z;M̂1,H1,1|α)f(α; q), (27)
where f1(z;M̂ 1,H1,1|α) is the conditional pdf of z given α. Taking the negative logarithm, problem
(27) is equivalent to
min
α
{
‖y −Aα‖22 +
L∑
i=1
2
q
(|αi|
q − 1)
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
gq(α)
(28)
where A = M̂
−1/2
1 V and y = M̂
−1/2
1 z. Notice that the first addendum of gq(α) corresponds to a
fitting term, whereas the second term promotes sparsity. Setting to zero the first derivative9 of gq(α) with
respect to α leads to
d
dα
[gq(α)] = A
†Aα−A†y + P−1q α = 0, (30)
9We make use of the following definition for the derivative of a real function f(α) with respect to the complex argument
α = αr + jαi , αr, αi ∈ R, [42]
∂f(α)
∂α
=
1
2
[
∂f(α)
∂αr
+ j
∂f(α)
∂αi
]
. (29)
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where P q = diag (pq), with pq = [|α1|
2−q, |α2|
2−q, ..., |αL|
2−q]T . Supposing that an initial estimate of
α is available, it is possible to apply a cyclic optimization procedure as in [39], and the step at the (m)th
iteration can be expressed as
α(m)q = P
(m−1)
q A
†
(
AP (m−1)q A
† + I
)−1
y, (31)
given P
(m−1)
q = diag (p
(m−1)
q ) from the (m− 1)th iteration. The optimization procedure can terminate
after a fixed number of iterations or when the following convergence criterion is satisfied
‖α
(m)
q −α
(m−1)
q ‖2
‖α
(m)
q ‖2
< ∆, (32)
with ∆ a suitable small positive number. As for the initial value of α, a possible choice is
α
(0)
i =
v(θi)
†M̂
−1
1 z
v(θi)†M̂
−1
1 v(θi)
, i = 1, . . . , L. (33)
It still remains to estimate q ∈ Ωq. As a preliminary step, we sample Ωq to come up with a finite set of
admissible values for q denoted by Ω¯q. Now, given q ∈ Ω¯q, let α˜q be the estimate of α provided by the
above iterative procedure, summarized in Algorithm 3, and estimate the number of peaks, h(q) say, in
α˜q as follows
1) sort the entries of α˜q from the largest to the smallest;
2) select h(q) returning the lowest value of BICq = 2‖y −Aα̂q‖
2
2 + 3h(q) log (2N), where 3h(q) is
the number of parameters to be estimated (namely, azimuth and complex amplitude for each active
peaks) and α̂q is the least-squares estimate for the selected peaks setting to zero the other entries
of α (denote by α¯q the final estimate of αq).
As a result, we obtain the set {BICq : q ∈ Ω¯q} and the estimate of q is obtained as q̂ = argminq∈Ω¯q BICq.
Finally, the adaptive LRT can be written as
f11(z; α¯qˆ,M̂ 1,H1,1)
f00(z;0,M̂1,H0,0)
H1,1
>
<
H0,0
η. (34)
Before concluding this section, we discuss the classification capabilities raising from α¯qˆ. Specifically, let
us recall that H1,1 can be viewed as the union of three hypotheses, namely H1,1 = ∪
3
i=1Hi. Now, in order
to mitigate the presence of false objects (ghosts) introduced by α¯qˆ and to merge contiguous estimates
(induced by energy spillover), we partition the set Θ into Ns subsets, Θi say, containing contiguous
AOAs. In addition, for simplicity, we assume that |Θ|/Ns = |Θ1| = . . . = |ΘNs | = Nθ ∈ N, namely that
all the subsets share the same number of contiguous AOAs. As a consequence, the generic subset can
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Algorithm 3 Sparse Learning Iterative Minimization (SLIM)
Input: ∆ > 0, q ∈ (0, 1], A, y
Output: α˜q
1: Set m = 0, α(0) =
[
v(θ1)†M̂
−1
1
z
v(θ1)†M̂
−1
1
v(θ1)
, . . . , v(θL)
†M̂
−1
1
z
v(θL)†M̂
−1
1
v(θL)
]T
,
2: Set m = m+ 1
3: Compute P
(m−1)
q = diag (p
(m−1)
q ), with p
(m−1)
q =
[
|α
(m−1)
1 |
2−q, |α
(m−1)
2 |
2−q, ..., |α
(m−1)
L |
2−q
]T
4: Compute α(m) = P
(m−1)
q A
†
(
AP
(m−1)
q A
† + I
)−1
y
5: If ‖α(m) −α(m−1)‖2/‖α
(m)‖2 < ∆ go to step 6 else go to step 2
6: Return α˜q = α
(m).
be written as
Θi = {θ(i−1)Nθ+1, . . . , θiNθ}, i = 1, . . . , Ns. (35)
Since the target AOA, θT say, is supposed to belong to Θ, then there exists i¯ ∈ {1, . . . , Ns} such that
θT ∈ Θi¯ and let us denote this subset as ΘT (= Θi¯). Thus, for classification purposes, we say that
a generic subset Θi, i ∈ {1, . . . , Ns}, contains coherent components if there exists at least an index
l ∈ {1, . . . , L} such that
α¯qˆ(l) 6= 0 and θl ∈ Θi. (36)
The above partitioning procedure allows us to define new vectors, γ and γ¯ qˆ say, of size Ns starting from
α and α¯qˆ, respectively, that contain information about the angular location in terms of Θi of the coherent
signals received by the system. Such vectors will be used at the analysis stage to quantify the algorithm
capability in drawing a picture of the entire operating scenario. Specifically, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , Ns}, we set
• γ(i) = 1 if condition (36) applied to α holds, otherwise γ(i) = 0;
• γ¯ qˆ(i) = 1 if (36) is valid, otherwise γ¯ qˆ(i) = 0.
Then, denoting by Ωγ , with |Ωγ | ≥ 1, the set of integers indexing the nonzero entries of γ¯ qˆ, we can
reason according to the following rationale
• if data contain only one coherent component (|Ωγ | = 1), which can be due to either an interferer or
a target, then there exists i˜ ∈ {1, . . . , Ns} such that Ωγ = {˜i} (namely, γ¯ qˆ (˜i) 6= 0 and γ¯ qˆ(i) = 0,
∀i 6= i˜) and two cases can occur
– Case 1: Θi˜ = ΘT , which implies that H1 holds true;
– Case 2: Θi˜ 6= ΘT , which implies that H2 is in force;
• if data contain more than one coherent component (|Ωγ | > 1), which can be generated by jammers
or the target, then the following cases have to be accounted for
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– Case 1: ∃i˜ ∈ Ωγ such that Θi˜ = ΘT ; in this case H3 is declared;
– Case 2: ∀i˜ ∈ Ωγ : Θi˜ 6= ΘT ; in this case H2 is declared.
Finally, the SLIM-based detector (34) can be incorporated into the architecture depicted in Figure 3, where
the condition on i˜ clearly is: ∃ i˜ ∈ Ωγ : Θi˜ = ΘT . It is important to highlight that such architecture can
absolve the functions of both SLB and SLC [2]. In fact, the use of M̂ 1 allows to place nulls along the
NLJ directions, while α¯qˆ allows to separate the target response from the coherent interferers.
Summarizing, the proposed approach allows to suitably handle situations where NLJs as well as CJs
attack the victim radar providing a tool for the discrimination between useful structured returns and
unwanted signals. In fact, focusing on the CUT only, the actual classification problem herein addressed
is the following multiple-hypothesis test
H1 : z = αTv(θT ) + n,
H2 : z =
Nq∑
i=1
βiv(θq,i) + n,
H3 : z = αTv(θT ) +
Nq∑
i=1
βiv(θq,i) + n,
H00 : z = n.
(37)
IV. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES
In this section, we analyze the performance of the new ECCM strategies against the disturbance
injected by NLJs and/or CJs through the antenna sidelobes. Specifically, in Subsection IV-A, we analyze
the performance in the first scenario (NLJ-only attack) while in Subsection IV-B, we investigate the
behavior of the SLIM-based detector when both NLJs and CJs are present.
A. NLJ-only Case
In this section, we present illustrative examples assessing the performance of the multi-stage architec-
tures devised in Section III-A in terms of Pd against the SINR. For comparison purpose, we also report
the Pd curves of the so-called Double Trained-AMF (DT-AMF) introduced in [37], the IDT-AMF with
known r, and the clairvoyant (non-adaptive) detector, i.e., the Matched Filter (MF) with known M1,
which represents an upper bound to the detection performance. The numerical examples are obtained
resorting to standard Monte Carlo counting techniques. More precisely, the Pd is estimated over 10
3
independent trials, whereas the detection thresholds are computed exploiting 100/Pfa independent trials.
In all the illustrative examples, we set N = 16, σ2 = 1, d = λ/2, and Pfa = 10
−4. The SINR is
defined as SINR = |α|2v(0)†M−11 v(0), while the considered scenario comprises three NLJs with the
same power from the following AOAs: θnj,1 = 15
◦, θnj,2 = 25
◦, and θnj,3 = −10
◦. Then, the resulting
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ICMs are given by M2 = I +
∑3
i=1 JNR v(θnj,i)v(θnj,i)
† and M1 = M2 + CNR M c. The (i, j)th
entry of M c is given by M c(i, j) = ρ
|i−j|, where ρ = 0.9 is the one-lag correlation coefficient. Finally,
the maximum number of NLJs is set to N/2 and the GIC parameter, ρ say, is equal to 2 (this choice
represents a reasonable compromise to limit the model overestimation).
In Figure 4, the Pd versus SINR for all the considered detectors is plotted assumingK = M = 20, JNR
= 30 dB and CNR = 20 dB. As it can be seen, the IDT-AMF-BIC, IDT-AMF-GIC and IDT-AMF-EIG
have nearly the same performance as the IDT-AMF with known r and they exhibit higher Pd values than
the DT-AMF with a gain of 0.6 dB at Pd = 0.9. The IDT-AMF-BIC, IDT-AMF-GIC, IDT-AMF-EIG
and IDT-AMF exhibit similar performances due to the fact that the stages responsible for the estimate
of r share the same estimation accuracy. As to the IDT-AMF-AIC, it experiences a loss about 1.0 dB
at Pd = 0.8 with respect to other proposed detectors but still has slightly higher Pd than the DT-AMF
in the low/medium SINR region. However, the IDT-AMF-AIC is not capable of achieving Pd = 1.0 for
higher SINR values at least for the considered parameter values.
To show the influence of K and M on the detection performance of the proposed detectors, in Figure
5 we set K = 14 leaving the other parameters as in Figure 4, whereas the parameter values in Figure 6
are the same as in Figure 4 but for M = 13. Inspection of Figure 5 confirms the trend observed in Figure
4. Moreover, the performance gain of the proposed detectors with respect to the DT-AMF increases as
K decreases. Precisely, the DT-AMF experiences a loss of about 8.5 dB at Pd = 0.9 with respect to the
architectures based upon BIC, GIC, and the modified ML estimation. Even though the IDT-AMF-AIC
performs better than the DT-AMF for SINR< 26 dB, it is still not capable of ensuring Pd = 1. Comparing
Figure 5 with Figure 4, we can note that each proposed detector experiences a loss of about 1 dB when K
decreases from 20 to 14. This is due to the fact that the estimation quality of r andM1 reduces. On the
other hand, Figure 6 highlights that, when M = 13 and K = 20, the IDT-AMF-GIC and IDT-AMF-EIG
overcome the IDT-AMF-BIC with a gain of 0.4 dB at Pd = 0.9, whereas the IDT-AMF-AIC has a severe
performance degradation. It is important to stress that the Pd curve of DT-AMF is not reported in Figure
6 since it is not defined when M < N .
Finally, in Figure 7, the Pd performances are investigated assuming K < N and M < N . In particular,
we set K = 14, M = 13 and leave unaltered the other parameters. The curves in Figure 7 indicate that
the detection performances of the IDT-AMF-GIC, IDT-AMF-EIG, and IDT-AMF are still similar while
the IDT-AMF-BIC experience a performance degradation of about 0.5 dB at Pd = 0.9.
Summarizing, architectures IDT-AMF-GIC, IDT-AMF-EIG, and IDT-AMF-BIC are effective solutions
to detect point-like targets in the presence of an unknown number of NLJs, with IDT-AMF-GIC and
IDT-AMF-EIG slightly superior to IDT-AMF-BIC. However, IDT-AMF-GIC requires to set a parameter
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while IDT-AMF-EIG exploits two thresholding stages. For this reason, the IDT-AMF-BIC emerges as a
viable means for practical implementation.
B. SLIM-based detector performance analysis (NLJs and CJs joint attack)
In this subsection, we investigate the behavior of the SLIM-based detector in a scenario which assumes
the joint presence of one NLJ and two CJs (Nq = 2). It is important to note that CJs can be also categorized
as targets, since they emulate echoes from an object of interest. For this reason, the considered performance
metrics concern the capability of the system to detect both target and CJs and to discriminate between the
echoes backscattered from the target and the echo-like signal transmitted by the CJs. The NLJ illuminates
the radar with a JNR of 30 dB and AOA θnj = 10
◦, whereas the CJs are located at θq,1 = −14
◦ and
θq,2 = 16
◦ and radiate power at the same JNR of 45 dB. Target signature is given by v(0) and the SINR
is defined as in the previous subsection. In other words, the operating scenario corresponds to H3. As
for the ICMs, M2 = I + JNRv(θnj)v(θnj)
†, whereas M1 is defined using the same parameters as in
the previous subsection.
The analysis, conducted by means of Monte Carlo simulation, is aimed at estimating the following
main performance metrics:
• the probability of detection (Pd) defined as the probability to declare H1,1 when the latter holds true
for a preassigned value of the Pfa, defined as the probability to declare H1,1 when H0,0 is in force;
• the probability of declaring the presence of a target under H3, which is denoted by Pt|H3 ;
• the probabilities of correct classification, namely the probability of declaring Hi, i = 1, 2, 3, when
it is on force.
Finally, to assess the estimation capabilities of the SLIM-based detector, additional figure of merits will
be suitably introduced in the second part of this section. All the mentioned metrics are estimated resorting
to 103 independent trials, while the detection threshold is computed over 100/Pfa independent trials. An
additional thresholding of the entries of α¯qˆ is applied to mitigate as much as possible the number of false
targets generated by the SLIM estimate especially at low SINR values. To this end, the threshold is set
to ensure a probability of declaring the presence of a false target equal to 10−2. Finally, all the numerical
examples assume N = 16, Pfa = 10
−4, an angular sector under surveillance ranging from −22◦ to 22◦
and uniformly sampled at 1 degree (namely, L = 45), and |Θi| = 5 with ΘT = {−2, . . . , 2}.
In Figure 8, we show the Pd and the Pt|H3 both as functions of the SINR and for (K,M) ∈
{(16, 16), (32, 32)}. As expected, the Pd is equal to 1 regardless the values of K, M , and SINR. This is
due to the presence of the CJs whose JNR is constant and equal to 45 dB. On the other hand, the Pt|H3
achieves 1 at SINR= 15 dB when (K,M) = (32, 32) and at SINR= 17 dB when (K,M) = (16, 16).
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Generally speaking, inspection of the figure highlights that increasing the volume of training samples
leads to a moderate improvement of the Pt|H3 .
It is important to highlight that the SLIM-based detector draws, as a byproduct, a picture of the
electromagnetic scenario under surveillance in terms of AOAs of possible passive or active objects.
However, this picture might contain false objects (ghosts) or ignore existing sources. Thus, it is worth to
evaluate to what extent the above phenomena take place. To this end, in Figure 9, we plot the following
figures of merit as functions of the SINR
• Root Mean Square (RMS) number of missed interferers, nmj say, evaluated by verifying that the
Θis corresponding to the two jammers refer to null entries of α¯qˆ;
• RMS number of ghosts, ng say, defined as the nonzero components of γ¯ qˆ in positions different from
that of the target and CJs;
• the Hausdorff metric [43] between γ and γ¯ qˆ. This metric belongs to the family of the multi-
object distances which are able to capture the error between two sets of vectors and is defined as
hd(X ,Y) = max{maxx∈X miny∈Y d(x, y),maxy∈Y minx∈X d(x, y)} with X and Y are the sets
of the coordinates of the nonzero entries of γ and γ¯ qˆ, respectively.
Note that the Hausdorff metric decreases as the SINR increases up to 15 dB and then it takes on a constant
value equal to ng = 0.4. Remarkably, the RMS number of missed jammers is close to zero regardless of
the SINR, since it depends on the JNR. Finally, Figure 10 contains the classification histograms assuming
SINR= 20 dB. More precisely, each subplot presents the probabilities P (Hi|Hk) as the percentages of
declaring Hi, i = 1, 2, 3, when Hk, k = 1, 2, 3, is in force. The histograms highlight that the probability
of correct classification, namely of deciding for Hi when the latter holds, is close to 1 at least for the
considered parameter setting.
Summarizing, the analysis shows that the SLIM-based detector is very versatile, since it can operates
in the presence of NLJ and/or CJs. More importantly, it can ensure excellent signal classification per-
formances allowing for the discrimination between the echoes backscattered from a target and coherent
signals emitted by hostile platforms.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have devised adaptive detection architectures with signal-processing-related ECCM
capabilities against the attack of NLJs and/or CJs from the antenna sidelobes. We have analyzed two
operating scenarios which differ for the presence of an unknown number of CJs assuming that two
independent sets of training samples are available for estimation purposes. Next, we have devised novel
signal processing procedures to estimate the ICM capable of providing reliable estimates even in the
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presence of a low volume of secondary data. Moreover, such estimation procedures work without knowing
the actual number of NLJs. In the case where CJs are present, we have conceived a multistage architecture
which leverages the hidden sparse nature of the data model to detect structured signals backscattered from
a target or generated by CJs. To this end, we have borrowed the SLIM paradigm proposed in [39]. The
performance analyses has highlighted that the newly proposed detection architectures exhibit satisfactory
performances and, more important, the SLIM-based detector with its classification capabilities can act
as an improved SLB, since, in the case where a target and CJs are simultaneously present, it does not
blank the possible detection.
Future research tracks might encompass the design of detection architectures for range-spread targets
based upon compressive sensing algorithms.
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APPENDIX A
MLE OF M2 FOR KNOWN r
In this Appendix, we provide the derivation of (7). To this end, compute the logarithm of LR(σ
2,Mnj)
and recast it by means of the eigendecompositions of M2 and RR
† as
lnL(σ2,Mnj) = −MN lnpi −M
{
r∑
i=1
ln(σ2 + λnj,i) + (N − r) lnσ
2
}
− tr
[
(σ2I +Λnj)
−1U †US1ΛS1U
†
S1U
]
= h(σ2,Λj ,U), (38)
where
• Λnj ∈ R
N×N is a diagonal matrix whose nonzero entries are the eigenvalues of Mnj with λnj,1 ≥
λnj,2 ≥ ... ≥ λnj,r > 0 and U ∈ C
N×N is the unitary matrix of the corresponding eigenvectors;
• ΛS1 ∈ R
N×N is a diagonal matrix whose nonzero entries are the eigenvalues of RR†, denoted by
γ1,1 ≥ γ1,2 ≥ ... ≥ γ1,N ≥ 0, and US1 ∈ C
N×N contains the corresponding eigenvectors.
Thus, the maximization of lnL(σ2,Mnj) with respect to M2 is equivalent to
max
σ2,Λj ,U
h(σ2,Λj,U ). (39)
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Now, the optimization with respect to U can be accomplished exploiting Theorem 1 [44], we obtain that
max
U
tr
[
(σ2I +Λj)
−1U †US1ΛS1U
†
S1U
]
= max
W 1
tr[(σ2I +Λj)
−1W 1ΛS1W
†
1]
= tr[(σ2I +Λj)
−1
ΛS1], (40)
whereW 1 = U
†US1. It is possible to show that optimization with respect to W 1 leads to W 1 = Ie
jθ1
for arbitrary θ1 ∈ [0, 2pi]. Thus, choosing for simplicity θ1 = 0, an MLE of U can be recast as Û = US1.
As a consequence, problem (39) becomes
max
σ2,Λj
g(σ2,Λj), (41)
where
g(σ2,Λj) = −MN lnpi−M
{
r∑
i=1
ln(σ2 + λj,i) + (N − r) lnσ
2
}
−
r∑
i=1
γ1,i
σ2 + λj,i
−
1
σ2
N∑
i=r+1
γ1,i. (42)
To estimate the remaining parameters, let us set to zero the gradient of g(σ2,Λj). Then, the resulting
estimates are given by
σ̂2 =
1
M(N − r)
N∑
i=r+1
γ1,i and λ̂j,i + σ̂
2 =
γ1,i
M
, i = 1, ..., r. (43)
Finally, the MLE of M̂2 is
M̂2 = US1(σ̂
2I + Λ̂j)U
†
S1, (44)
where σ̂2I + Λ̂j = diag
{
γ1,1
M , . . . ,
γ1,r
M ,
1
M(N−r)
∑N
i=r+1 γ1,i, . . . ,
1
M(N−r)
∑N
i=r+1 γ1,i
}
.
APPENDIX B
MLE OFM c FOR KNOWN M2
Assume that M 2 is known and consider the following maximization problem
max
M c
LZ(M c), (45)
June 28, 2019 DRAFT
24
where LZ(M c) is defined by (8). To solve (45), let us recast the logarithm of LZ(M c) as
−KN lnpi −K ln det(M 2)−K ln det(I +M
− 1
2
2 M cM
− 1
2
2 )
− tr
[
(I +M
− 1
2
2 M cM
− 1
2
2 )
−1M
− 1
2
2 ZZ
†M
− 1
2
2
]
= −KN lnpi −K ln det(M2)−K ln det(I +Ωc)− tr
[
(I +Ωc)
−1V †US2ΛS2U
†
S2V
]
= LZ(V ,Ωc), (46)
where the last equality is due to the eigendecomposition of M
− 1
2
2 M cM
− 1
2
2 and ZZ
†. In fact, in (46),
ΛS2 ∈ R
N×N is a diagonal matrix whose nonzero entries are the eigenvalues ofM
− 1
2
2 ZZ
†M
− 1
2
2 denoted
by γ2,1 ≥ ... ≥ γ2,N ≥ 0 with US2 ∈ C
N×N the unitary matrix of the corresponding eigenvectors
and Ωc ∈ R
N×N is the diagonal matrix containing the eigenvalues of M
− 1
2
2 M cM
− 1
2
2 denoted by
λc,1 ≥ ... ≥ λc,N > 0 with V ∈ C
N×N the unitary matrix of the corresponding eigenvectors. It follows
that problem (45) becomes
max
V ,Ωc
LZ(V ,Ωc). (47)
The optimization with respect to V can be accomplished adopting the same line of reasoning as for W 1
in Appendix A, namely
max
V
tr
[
(I +Ωc)
−1V †US2ΛS2U
†
S2V
]
= max
W 2
tr[(I +Ωc)
−1W 2ΛS2W
†
2]
= tr[(I +Ωc)
−1
ΛS2], (48)
where W 2 = V
†US2 and the last equality comes from the fact that Ŵ 2 = Ie
jθ2 with θ2 ∈ [0, 2pi]
arbitrary. As a result, an estimate of V is V̂ = US2.
The final step consists in solving
max
Ωc
g¯(Ωc), (49)
where
g¯(Ωc) = −K
N∑
i=1
ln(1 + λc,i)−
N∑
i=1
γ2,i
1 + λc,i
. (50)
Thus, setting to zero the gradient of g¯(Ωc), we obtain
λ̂c,i = max
{γ2,i
K
− 1, 0
}
, i = 1, . . . , N. (51)
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Gathering the above results, the MLE of M c for known M2 is
M̂ c[M 2] =M
1
2
2US2Ω̂cU
†
S2M
1
2
2 , (52)
where Ω̂c = diag
{
λ̂c,1, . . . , λ̂c,N
}
.
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Figure 1. Three-stage Detection Architectures.
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Figure 2. Eigenvalues of M2 in the presence of NLJs assuming N = 8 and JNR= 30 dB for all NLJs.
Figure 3. Block scheme of the SLIM-based detection architecture.
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Figure 4. Pd versus SINR for the MF, IDT-AMF, IDT-AMF-AIC, IDT-AMF-BIC, IDT-AMF-GIC, IDT-AMF-EIG and DT-AMF
assuming N = 16, K = M = 20, CNR=20 dB and JNR=30 dB.
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Figure 5. Pd versus SINR for the MF, IDT-AMF, IDT-AMF-AIC, IDT-AMF-BIC, IDT-AMF-GIC, IDT-AMF-EIG and DT-AMF
assuming N = 16, K = 14, M = 20, CNR=20 dB and JNR=30 dB.
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Figure 6. Pd versus SINR for the MF, IDT-AMF, IDT-AMF-AIC, IDT-AMF-BIC, IDT-AMF-GIC, and IDT-AMF-EIG assuming
N = 16, K = 20, M = 13, CNR=20 dB and JNR=30 dB.
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Figure 7. Pd versus SINR for the MF, IDT-AMF, IDT-AMF-AIC, IDT-AMF-BIC, IDT-AMF-GIC and IDT-AMF-EIG assuming
N = 16, K = 14, M = 13, CNR=20 dB and JNR=30 dB.
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Figure 8. Performance of the SLIM-based detector in terms of Pd and Pt|H3 versus SINR for M = K = 16 and M = K = 32.
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Figure 9. RMS values of nmj , ng , and hd(·, ·) assuming M = K = 16.
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Figure 10. Classification histograms for all the three hypotheses H1, H2, and H3 assuming M = K = 16 and SINR= 20 dB.
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